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I V 
ARGUMENT 
L ONLY R & R'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION SERVES THE UTAH 
ACT'S PURPOSE OF PROTECTING INSUREDS 
When considering the competing statutory interpretations offered by R & R and 
UPCIGA, the Court must ask which interpretation best serves the stated purpose of the 
Act, which is "to protect resident policy owners and insureds under all types of direct 
insurance. . .." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-202. Clearly, only R & R's proposed 
interpretation serves this purpose. 
"It is well-settled.. . . that our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the 
legislative intent as evidenced by the statute's plain language in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve." Summit Water Distr. Co, v. Summit Cty.9 123 P.3d437, 
442 (Utah 2005). 
UPCIGA's proposed interpretation would offset amounts R & R received from 
other insurers from UPCIGA's statutory coverage obligation to the insureds of Reliance 
Insurance Company. This would place UPCIGA's own interests above the interests of 
Reliance's insureds. R & R's proposed interpretation would allow the insured, CDR, the 
maximum liability protection permitted under UPCIGA's $300,000 per-covered-claim 
statutory obligation. This interpretation would "protect" CDR from an excess judgment 
that would place its own assets at risk. 
UPCIGA clamors that adoption of R & R's interpretation would "usurp the 
legislative branch function" by adopting a pro-insured policy "by judicial fiat." See 
Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 9. Quite the contrary, R & R's 
interpretation is the sole interpretation that would effect the stated purpose of the statute -
the protection of insureds and policyholders. 
UPCIGA also claims that the Utah Act "does not state its purpose is to put the 
insured in the same position it would have been had there been no insolvency." See 
Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 9. This merely states the 
obvious. UPCIGA's statutory obligation is $300,000 per covered claim. If the Utah Act 
were meant to restore insureds to their pre-insurer-insolvency status, there would be no 
statutory cap on UPCIGA's obligation. Yet UPCIGA complains that even this restrictive 
cap on its obligations is insufficient. It suggests the Court go even further, and adopt a 
reading of the Utah Act that would render its legislative mandate to protect insureds 
meaningless in most instances. 
UPCIGA correctly states that this Court is not "bound by judicial interpretations of 
other jurisdictions who are construing different statutes than Utah's." See Reply Brief of 
Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 10. What does bind this Court is the legislative 
pronouncement of the Utah Act, which expressly states that its purpose is to "protect 
resident policyholders and insureds." Only by adopting R & R's proposed statutory 
interpretation, and by following the analysis of cases which support that interpretation, 
can the Court fulfill the mandate of the Utah legislature. 
II. THE UTAH ACT IS AMBIGUOUS 
UPCIGA argues that the Utah Act is unambiguous. Curiously, UPCIGA does so 
without at all addressing the standard for statutory ambiguity - it simply argues that its 
preferred interpretation of the statute is supported by the statute's plain language. See 
Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 11. 
In order to find the statute ambiguous, the Court need only find that either of 
R & R's proposed interpretations of the statute is plausible. A statute is ambiguous 
"when it is capable of two or more plausible meanings." Derbidge v. Mutual Protective 
Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "In other words, for a proffered 
alternative interpretation to [be found plausible], it must be more than a conjecture but 
may be less than a certainty." Saleh v. Farmers Inc. Exch., 133 P.3d 428, 433 (Utah 
2006). 
R & R has advanced two plausible interpretations of the Utah Act which support 
offset from the total loss, rather than UPCIGA5 s statutory obligation. UPCIGA does not 
even attempt to show why either is not plausible. See Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief 
of Cross Appellee at 10-15. Rather, UPCIGA argues as follows: 
R & R and Alumatek contend that the reference to "any amount payable" under an 
insurance policy somehow changes the plain meaning of the statute to mean 
UPCIGA only offsets monies received from other insurance policies against the 
"total amount of loss to the insured." The problem with that interpretation is that 
it requires the reader to ignore the plain language of the statute that requires "any 
amount payable on the covered claim is reduced by the amount of any recovery 
under the insurance policy described in Subsection 1(a)."1 A covered claim is 
only a claim up to $300,000. . . . The phrase "[a]ny amount payable on a covered 
claim under this part under an insurance policy is reduced by the amount of any 
recovery under the insurance policy described in subsection 1(a)" has to apply to 
offset UPCIGA's obligation of up to $300,000, because UPCIGA is not obligated 
on any "amount payable on a covered claim" above the $300,000 statutory limit. 
1
 Here, UPCIGA misstates the language of the applicable section. The actual language of 
the section reads: "Any amount payable on a covered claim under this part under an 
insurance policy is reduced by the amount of any recovery under the insurance policy 
described in Subsection (l)(a). 
^ 
See Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 11. 
As stated in R & R's opening brief, R & R's proposed interpretations are both 
plausible, and directly at odds with UPCIGA's. The Utah Act states that UPCIGA's 
"obligation" on covered claims is "only that amount of each covered claim that is less 
than $300,000." Yet Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-213, which describes UPCIGA's setoff 
rights on covered claims, contains undefined terms that render it ambiguous: 
a) Any person who has a claim against an insurer, whether or not the 
insurer is a member insurer, under any provision in an insurance policy, 
other than a policy of an insolvent insurer that is also a covered claim, is 
required to first exhaust that person's right under that person's policy. 
(b) Any amount payable on a covered claim under this part under an 
insurance policy is reduced by the amount of any recovery under the 
insurance policy described in Subsection (l)(a). 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-213. 
The phrases "amount payable" and "an insurance policy" are not defined. The 
phrase "[a]fry amount payable on a covered claim under this part under an insurance 
policy" can therefore plausibly refer to any amount payable on a covered claim under any 
insurance policy. The phrase "an insurance policy" does not limit itself to the specific 
insurance policy for which UPCIGA is obligated. Under such a reading, as stated in 
R & R's opening brief, would bind UPCIGA to the full $300,000 amount per claim. 
Additionally, the term "claim" is also ambiguous. The term "covered claim" is 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-203: 
an unpaid claim, including an unpaid claim under a personal lines policy 
for unearned premiums submitted by a claimant, if: 
4 
(i) the claim arises out of the coverage; 
(ii) the claim is within the coverage; 
(iii) the claim is not in excess of the applicable limits of an 
insurance policy to which this part applies; 
(iv) the insurer who issued the policy becomes an insolvent 
insurer; and 
(v) (A) the claimant or insured is a resident of this state at the 
time of the insured event; or 
(B) the claim is a first-party claim for damage to property that 
is permanently located in this state. 
The term "claim" stands alone in the definition of "covered claim." As stated in 
R & R's opening brief, if "claim" is defined as an abstract legal interest, right or remedy, 
then Section 213 could be read as follows: 
(b) Any amount payable on a covered claim (an abstract legal right or 
remedy that validly arises under an insolvent insurer's policy) under this 
part under an insurance policy, is reduced by the amount of any recovery 
under the insurance policy described in Subsection 1(a) 
Both of R & R's proffered interpretations are plausible and reasonable. These 
interpretations are the only interpretations that will serve the Act's legislatively mandated 
purpose of protecting policyholders and insureds. 
III. SUBSTANTIAL CASE LAW SUPPORTS R & R'S POSITION 
UPCIGA argues that the majority of case law interpreting similar statutes may 
actually support its statutory interpretation regarding offset. See Reply Brief of Appellant 
and Brief of Cross Appellee at 13-14. Upon review of the cases cited by UPCIGA, 
R & R acknowledges that the cases nationwide that support its interpretation may either 
be in the majority, in the minority, or the cases may be equally divided. One case 
undercutting UPCIGA's position that UPCIGA fails to cite is Indiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. 
c 
Blickensderfer, 778 N.E.2d 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).2 In Blickensderfer, two physicians 
were sued for medical malpractice and they sought defense and indemnity from the 
Indiana Guaranty Association. Each doctor held a malpractice policy with $100,000 per 
occurrence. The health insurers of both claimants each paid over $100,000 in medical 
expenses for the injuries resulting from the malpractice. The Guaranty Association 
claimed an offset under the statutory non-duplication provision. The court held that no 
setoff was permitted since health insurance benefits were expressly excluded under the 
Act and because allowing the setoff would yield "an absurd result:" 
The Indiana legislature surely did not intend that the statute would require a 
claimant to exhaust a claimant's rights under any conceivable insurance 
policy for any conceivable claim that may then be pending, even if such a 
claim or such a policy had nothing to do with the claim against the 
insolvent insurer. Such an interpretation would indeed produce an absurd 
result. 
M a t 443. 
In the present case, UPCIGA's proposed interpretation, too, would result in 
absurdity. Though the stated purpose of the Act is to "protect insureds," UPCIGA would 
have its minimal statutory obligation offset by recovery from every conceivable policy, 
for any conceivable claim that may be pending, even if such a claim or such a policy had 
nothing to do with the claim against the insolvent insurer. UPCIGA is correct that how 
other jurisdictions construe their own Guaranty Acts "ultimately may not make a 
difference because this court must construe the Utah statute." The Utah statute's stated 
2
 As Blickensderfer supports R & R's position on statutory interpretation, the tally of 
cases cited by R & R and UPCIGA presently stands at 14 cases in favor of R & R's 
position and 14 cases in favor of UPCIGA's position. 
c 
purpose is protecting insureds. R & R's interpretation is the only interpretation that 
accomplishes that end. 
IV. THE EXCESS POLICY ALSO PROVIDES COVERAGE 
UPCIGA makes no effort to address R & R's arguments regarding coverage under 
Reliance's excess policy, which also triggers UPCIGA's second $300,000 obligation. 
Because R & R's total damages available under the Reliance policies, including both 
subrogated and unsubrogated losses, exceeded $1 million, UPCIGA's obligation to pay 
an additional $300,000 is clearly triggered. 
The relevant insuring language under the Reliance excess policy reads: 
7. Subject to 4., 5., or 6. above, whichever applies, EXCESS 
LIABILITY COVERAGE is excess of an amount not less than the amount 
shown in the Schedule of Primary Insurance for the applicable primary 
insurance, except: [neither exception applies] 
The amount shown in the EXCESS UMBRELLA COVERAGE 
SCHEDULE OF PRIMARY INSURANCE for the applicable primary 
insurance is as follows: 
General Liability Insurance 
Policy Number: PB 1 14079 1 Policy Period: From 1010 1/98 to: 
1010 1100 
General Aggregate Limit $2,000,000 
(Other than Products-Completed Operations) 
Products-Completed Operations $2,000,000 
Personal Injury and Advertising Injury Limit $1,000,000 
Per Occurrence Limit $1,000,000 
Fire, Explosion or Water Damage Limit $100,000 
(R. 2870) 
The underlying $1,000,000 loss limit is clearly met, R & R was paid 
$1,517,609.86 by CNA, its first party insurer. This amount could have been sought by 
n 
R & R in a subrogation lawsuit against CDR, had Reliance not become insolvent. 
However, as discussed earlier, subrogated losses are not permitted recoveries under the 
Act. Subrogated losses, however, are recoverable (or at least not precluded) under the 
language of the Reliance excess policy.3 Had Reliance remained solvent, its exposure 
would have included the $1,517,609.86 in subrogated losses suffered by R & R. Since 
R & R was awarded $399,898.67 in unsubrogated losses inclusive of prejudgment 
interest at the evidentiary hearing, R & R's total losses recoverable from CDR were 
$1,917,508.53. UPCIGA's cited case, Huggins v. Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc. and ABC 
Insurance Co., 950 So.2d 750 (La. Ct. App. 2006), is therefore inapposite. lnHuggins, 
the insured expressly stipulated that her damages did not exceed one million dollars, the 
limit of the underlying policy issued by Reliance. In the present case, R & R's total 
damages clearly exceeded $1 million, triggering coverage under the umbrella policy. 
The "purpose" of the Act is to "protect resident policy owners and insureds under 
all types of direct insurance.. . ." The Act does not differentiate between primary and 
excess insurance. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-202 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the 
definition of "covered claim" under the Act includes a claim that "is not in excess of the 
applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this part applies." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-28-203. R & R's total damages exceeded the $1 million "per occurrence" limit of 
the primary policy, and its unsubrogated losses trigger coverage under the second $1 
3
 "[Ijnsurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." U. S. Fidelity & 
Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) 
Q 
million available under the excess policy. Thus, UPCIGA is liable for the $300,000 
statutory limit on both policies.4 
V. THE INADEQUACY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
RELIEVE R & R OF THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT 
UPCIGA makes no attempt to address the inadequacy of the trial court's findings 
of fact, noted by R & R in its opening brief. See Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross Appellee at 16-28. This point should be deemed conceded, and R & R and 
Alumatek relieved of the marshaling requirement. 
The two challenged findings contradict one another - finding 7 states that R & R 
failed to disclose it had received insurance proceeds for lost rents. Finding 14 states that 
R & R did disclose such information to UPCIGA on September 15, 2006, a mere 18 days 
after R & R promised, in a discovery response, that it would supplement its answers. 
This presents a conundrum for both R & R and Alumatek - must evidence be 
marshaled showing non-disclosure of insurance proceeds for lost rents? Or must 
evidence be marshaled showing disclosure of insurance proceeds for lost rents on 
4
 Though UPCIGA claims that "Alumatek has conceded that Judge Frederick's decision 
on the stacking of the policies was erroneous," R & R makes no such concession. See 
Reply Brief of Appellant^and Brief ofjCross Appellee at 15. R & R's arguments on the 
excess policy stated herein provide the Utah Court of Appeals independent grounds, 
supported by the record, upon which to affirm Judge Frederick's decision regarding 
coverage under the excess policies. "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm 
the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on 
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court 
to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory 
is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was 
not considered or passed on by the lower court." State v. Topanotes, 16 P.3d 1159,1161 
(Utah 2003) (internal quotations omitted). 
Q 
September 15, 2006? Evidence supporting one finding would necessarily disprove the 
other. Marshaling evidence would therefore amount to a nonsensical exercise. Because 
the trial court's findings are logically contradictory, they are insufficient as a matter of 
law and the marshaling requirement is inapplicable. 
VI. R & R PROPERLY MARSHALED ALL COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the trial court findings, R & R, out of caution, 
undertook the marshaling requirement. UPCIGA claims that R & R "failed to marshal all 
the evidence in support of the challenged findings regarding R & R's failure to disclose 
insurance proceeds received from CNA Insurance for loss of rents. . . ." See Reply Brief 
of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee at 18-19. This allegation seems to evidence a 
lack of understanding of both the marshaling requirement and the term "competent 
evidence." 
"[T]he duty to marshal evidence contemplates that an appellant present every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists and then ferret out the fatal flaw in the evidence, becoming a devil's 
advocate." In re E, K, 137 P.3d 809, 822 (Utah 2006) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
Evidence marshaled must therefore 1) be introduced at trial; and 2) be competent 
evidence. Black's Law Dictionary defines "competent evidence" as "admissible 
evidence." "Admissible evidence" is "evidence that is relevant and is of such a character 
(e.g., not prejudicial, based on hearsay, or privileged) that the court should receive it." 
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., at 595-96 (2004). 
In the present case, R & R would therefore have a duty to marshal relevant 
admissible evidence, introduced at trial that supports the following contradictory 
findings: 
7. The Court finds that there was an agreement dated May 6, 2003 between 
the parties that provided UPCIGA would make automatic payments of 
$300,000 to R & R and Alumatek if they prevailed in the declaratory 
judgment action based upon representations by R & R and Alumatek that 
their damages greatly exceeded $300,000. This agreement is not 
enforceable as R & R failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for 
lost rent damages, and R & R and Alumatek must meet their burden of 
proof before they are entitled to any damages. (R. 3452) 
14. UPCIGA was not provided information about insurance proceeds 
received by R & R from CNA Insurance until September 15, 2006, in the 
form of the letter from Nathaneal Y. Cook of Adjusters International 
introduced as trial Exhibit 24 that explains R & R received $174,227. Prior 
to September 15, 2006, counsel for UPCIGA had renewed its previous 
discovery request for information about insurance proceeds received by R 
& R for lost rents. (R. 3453) 
Upon close examination of UPCIGA's cited evidence in support of these findings, 
it does not constitute "competent evidence," and in some cases is not evidence at all. 
R & R has clearly fulfilled the marshaling requirement. 
A. Kelly Johnson's supplemental report (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross 
Appellee at 19). 
R & R has previously marshaled the trial testimony of Kelly Johnson, referencing 
the preparation of his supplemental report, fulfilling the marshaling requirement on this 
point. Nonetheless, Mr. Johnson's supplemental report is not relevant evidence on either 
of the trial court's findings, because it never discussed when Mr. Johnson received the 
1 1 
information from R & R on lost lease income - it merely stated the date he prepared his 
supplemental report. As such, it has no probative bearing on the trial court's factual 
finding No. 14, that UPCIGA was not provided evidence on lost rent income until 
September 15, 2006. It too, obviously, is irrelevant to factual finding No. 7, that R & R 
"failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for lost rent damages." As such, 
Mr. Johnson's supplemental report is not competent evidence subject to the marshaling 
requirement. 
B. Finding that UPCIGA's expert was more credible (Reply Brief and Brief of 
Cross Appellee at 19). 
The fact that UPCIGA's expert on lost rent damages was found more credible and 
persuasive than Mr. Johnson is not relevant evidence on either of the challenged findings. 
In fact, it is not evidence at all. UPCIGA makes no attempt to explain any sort of logical 
nexus between the comparative credibility of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kilbourne's 
testimony, and whether 1) R & R provided evidence on lost rent income to UPCIGA until 
September 15, 2006; or 2) whether R & R ever provided UPCIGA evidence on lost lease 
income. As such, this is not competent evidence subject to the marshaling requirement. 
C. Judge Frederick's comments (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross Appellee at 
20}. 
Comments by a judge at the opening of a bench trial do not constitute evidence, 
much less competent evidence. 
D. Trial testimony of Patrick Kilbourne (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross 
Appellee at 20). 
R & R had previously marshaled trial testimony of Mr. Kilbourne on the 
preparation of his report, and therefore has complied with the marshaling requirement. 
Nonetheless, the Kilbourne testimony cited here is not relevant evidence on either of the 
trial court's findings, because it never discussed when UPCIGA received the information 
from R & R on lost lease income - it merely stated that Mr. Kilbourne did not have the 
information at the time he prepared his first report (on January 24, 2006), or at the time of 
Mr. Johnson's deposition. As such, it has no probative bearing on the trial court's factual 
finding No. 14, that UPCIGA was not provided evidence on lost rent income until 
September 15, 2006. It too, obviously, is irrelevant to factual finding No. 7, that R & R 
"failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for lost rent damages." As such, the 
cited testimony is not competent evidence subject to the marshaling requirement. 
E. Arguments of UPCIGA counsel Gerry Holman (Reply Brief and Brief of 
Cross Appellee at 21). 
Though R & R previously marshaled the arguments of UPCIGA's counsel, it is 
well-settled that arguments of counsel at trial do not constitute evidence. See In the 
Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(finding that assertions made in oral argument by counsel, which were not included in the 
affidavit of counsel's client, did not constitute evidence properly considered by the trial 
court). Therefore, the arguments of UPCIGA's counsel do not constitute competent 
evidence subject to the marshaling requirement. 
F. Third-Party Complaint of R & R and Summary Judgment Memorandum of 
R & R (Reply Brief and Brief .of Cross Appellee at 21V 
It is also well-settled that pleadings are not considered evidence, unless they are 
properly offered and received as exhibits at trial. See Ryan v. Beaver County, 21 P.2d 
858 (Utah 1933) ("It is the duty of the court to construe pleadings and to charge the jury 
on the issues. It is not proper to permit the jury to take the pleadings with them to the 
jury room, unless they have been put in evidence as proof of some fact, and then they are 
taken, not because they are pleadings, but exhibits.") Since the referenced pleadings 
were not offered and received as trial exhibits, they are not competent evidence subject to 
the marshaling requirement. 
It is telling that UPCIGA not only refers to incompetent evidence, but also non-
evidence to support Judge Frederick's inexplicable action of unilaterally invalidating a 
valid settlement agreement. R & R has marshaled what little evidentiary support exists in 
the record for this action. Such evidence clearly does not support the findings that 
UPCIGA was not provided evidence on lost rent income until September 15, 2006, or 
that R & R "failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for lost rent damages." 
VII. UNILATERALLY INVALIDATING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
In UPCIGA's attempt to distinguish the case law relied upon by R & R and 
Alumatek, UPCIGA fails to address the substantive law on invalidating settlement 
agreements. Generally, a negotiated written settlement can only be set aside for the 
following reasons: illegality, fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake. In the Matter of 
Estate ofChasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986). Evidence necessary to invalidate a 
1 A 
settlement agreement must be "clear, convincing, and unequivocal." Jimenez v. O'Brien, 
213 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1949). The standard "is a higher degree of proof than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence and approaches that degree of proof required in a criminal 
case, viz., 'beyond reasonable doubt.5" Id. 
The record is clear. No cause of action or counterclaim for rescission based upon 
illegality, fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake was ever pled or properly before the 
trial court. (R. 2686; 2695) For example, UPCIGA raises "fraud" as an affirmative 
defense in its Answer, with no supporting facts. (R. 2686; 2695) This fails to plead fraud 
or misrepresentation with the requisite particularity under the Utah rules. Utah R. Civ. P. 
9(b); Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974 , 979-80 (Utah Ct App. 2003). No motion to 
invalidate the settlement agreement was ever before the trial court.5 (R. 3139-3225; 
3502) Moreover, the dearth of record evidence that even touches upon the validity of the 
settlement agreement, as well as the confusing and contradictory findings of the trial 
court on the issue, falls far short of the "clear, convincing, and unequivocal" standard 
required by Jimenez. The trial court's action of invalidating the settlement agreement 
was utterly unsupported by the pleadings, the facts, or the law. The agreement should be 
reinstated. 
5
 The court should note that even the cases cited by UPCIGA involve a motion to rescind 
or enforce a settlement agreement, which was properly before the trial court. Quinn v. 
City of Kansas City, 64 F.Supp.2d 1084 (D. Kan. 1999); United States v. Hardage, 982 
F.2d 1491 (10th Cir. 1993). It is undisputed that no such motion was properly before 
Judge Frederick. 
1 C 
CONCLUSION 
When considering the dueling interpretations of the Utah Guaranty Act, the Court 
need only ask one question: which interpretation best serves the Act's stated purpose of 
"protecting" insureds and policyholders? UPCIGA's interpretation of the Act would 
punish insureds for buying multiple insurance policies. It would harm insureds, while 
protecting only itself. This contravenes the Act's stated purpose, basic notions of 
fairness, and common sense. The Court of Appeals should affirm the trial court's 
interpretation of the Act as well as the trial court's interpretation of UPCIGA's 
obligations under both the Rehance primary and excess policies, and the trial court's 
judgment in favor of R & R. The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's 
invalidation of the Settlement Agreement. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2008. 
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Attorneys for Appellees / Cross-Appellants 
R & R Industrial Park, L. L. C. 
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